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INTRODUCTION
It is obvious that, as sexual animals, human beings have a capacity and need
for erotic love and that this love may take a diversity of forms and objects. Obvious
too, that in addition to an esthetics of sexuality, there must also be an ethics and
even politics of sexuality. Yet long books on justice, equality, liberty, etc., have been
written as if these issues are either irrelevant or too delicate to discuss. One exception to the silence of the canon may be found in liberal jurisprudence. From Jeremy
Bentham to Ronald Dworkin, that tradition has sought, especially, to defend the
interests of sexual minorities against a variety of attacks.
In part, this engagement of jurisprudence with sexuality resulted from the confluence of two views: that sexuality is an elemental drive, and that law is a repressive
force. Recently, however, those views have been challenged or at least qualified
by new theories of sexuality. A leading influence here is the work of the French
writer Michel Foucault, together with the earlier and indigenous 'labelling theory'
in sociology. On this account, our sexualities and the categories through we understand them-for instance, 'lesbian', 'gay', 'bisexual', or 'straight'-are not part
of the furniture of the universe but rather are themselves produced by systems of
regulation including the law. This attitude, often called 'constructivist', 'anti-essentialist', or even 'post-modernist', is now the controlling voice in theorizing sexuality.
Do such theories matter to jurisprudence? How relevant is knowing the ontological status of categories like 'gay' or 'straight', or for that matter 'man' or
'woman', to our normative concerns aboutjustice, equality, or liberty? One might
say, not at all. Explaining the injustice of discriminating against lesbian mothers
no more requires an ontology and than explaining the injustice of religious persecution requires a theology. Vastly more popular than this is the thought that a
constructivist ontology is somehow liberating, that it unmasks the ways in which
law not only represses but produces sexuality and thus alerts us to new forms and
abuses of power.
Among the present contributors, Richard Mohr puts the most direct and urgent
challenge to the new view. So far from having a liberatory potential, the post-modern conception embraces an ethical relativism that has no resources to combat
oppression and defend rights to privacy, equality and free expression. An opposing
position is taken up by Carl Stychin, who in his analysis of equality rights jurisprudence in Canada detects a kind of immutabilist essentialism. He finds that doctrine
both misguided and unattractive, for it precludes a more fundamental critique of
heterosexism. He wants the benefits of human rights law but without the risks of
categorial thinking.
Two papers probe the overlapping issue of personal choice in arguments about
sexuality. Richard Nordahl contends that even one as sympathetic to gay rights as
is Ronald Dworkin must fail to clinch the case if he appeals only to respect for
choices. In contrast to Stychin, Nordahl insists on the reality of gays as a distinct
grouping of people, and on the relevance of empirical evidence about the nature
of sexual orientation to our normative judgments. The notion of choice, however,
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is a complex one and may figure in a normative argument in a variety of ways. One
familiar view holds that we should be free to choose in order to be true to ourselves.
Charles Taylor has argued that if this ambition is not to end up being self-defeating,
it must look to external horizons of significance beyond the individual in order to
ground those choices. From this it supposedly follows that minority sexual orientations deserve respect and recognition only if there is a certain kind of significance
to one's 'choice' of orientation. In my paper, I refute this view, and attempt to clarify
the proper role of choice in arguments about sexuality, and to defend the modern
notion of authenticity.
Allan Hutchinson joins the issue of pornography on the side of the post-modems.
A sad irony of academic life is that Richard Mohr's important book Gay Ideas was
for a time subject to a customs ban in Canada, a ban invigorated by the anti-pornography views of Catharine MacKinnon as transmitted through certain feminist groups
and on to the Supreme Court in its Butler decision. While Mohr says that postmodems have inadequate resources to defend free speech, that is precisely what
Hutchinson offers. Stressing the constructedness and contingency of all meanings,
Hutchinson seeks to undermine MacKinnon's view as wrongly essentialist and to
put in its place a nuanced and context-dependent politics of speech.
In the interstices of the law, there is sometimes room for self-help in defense
of one's rights. Andrea Austen and Alex Wellington here assess one sort of selfhelp in the defense of gay rights. What has come to be known as 'outing' is the
practice of exposing gay people who are in hiding. While Mohr has been a powerful
advocate of this strategy, Austen and Wellington offer a more cautious assessment,
defending it only when necessary in self-defense and pointing out its many hazards.
Our final two discussions take up the issue of rape. Keith Burgess-Jackson gives
close scrutiny to the ways in which conceptual disputes about the nature of rape
influence opinion about the legitimacy of 'statutory rape laws', laws that make it
an offense to have sex with someone under a prescribed age. Depending on whether
one takes 'conservative', 'radical', or 'liberal' views about the nature of rape and
the grounds for prohibiting it, one will have different attitudes towards the legitimacy of such laws, and to permissible defenses to charges under them. J.H. Bogart
puts the question in its most general terms-what is rape? He defends a view of
rape as nonconsensual sex, an idea broader than the notion of non-voluntary sex.
Consent requires more than the mere fact that sex is undertaken voluntarily as the
result of a choice; it also requires that sex be chosen on the basis of adequate information, unmanipulated desire, and a recognition of the consequences of the act.
This distinction will often make a difference; for example, people may be drunk
enough to render their consent invalid without rendering their actions non-voluntary.
The specific evils of rape are best understood in light of the violation of the validity
conditions of such consent.
The issues raised in this volume-the nature and significance of our notions of
sexuality, the intersection of these with our normative concerns-are all of them
deep and urgent. These papers aspire to continue a tradition of jurisprudential argument that recognizes their centrality.
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